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Abstract A fund manager invests both the fund’s assets and own private wealth in
separate but potentially correlated risky assets, aiming to maximize expected utility
from private wealth in the long run. If relative risk aversion and investment opportu-
nities are constant, we find that the fund’s portfolio depends only on the fund’s invest-
ment opportunities, and the private portfolio only on private opportunities. This con-
clusion is valid both for a hedge fund manager, who is paid performance fees with a
high-water mark provision, and for a mutual fund manager, who is paid management
fees proportional to the fund’s assets. The manager invests earned fees in the safe
asset, allocating remaining private wealth in a constant-proportion portfolio, while
the fund is managed as another constant-proportion portfolio. The optimal welfare
is the maximum between the optimal welfare of each investment opportunity, with
no diversification gain. In particular, the manager does not use private investments to
hedge future income from fees.
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1 Introduction
Performance fees are the main driver of hedge fund managers’ compensation. Typical
performance fees amount to 20% of a fund’s profits, subject to a high-water mark
provision, which requires past losses to be recovered before further fees are paid.
By contrast, mutual fund managers receive as management fees a fixed proportion –
about 1% annually – of assets under management.
A manager’s large exposure to the fund’s performance is a powerful incentive to
deliver superior returns, but is also a potential source of moral hazard, as the manager
may use private wealth to hedge such exposure. Extant models (Ross, 2004; Carpen-
ter, 2000; Panageas and Westerfield, 2009; Guasoni and Obło´j, 2013) acknowledge
this issue, but avoid it rather than modeling it, by assuming that private wealth, includ-
ing earned fees, are invested at the risk-free rate. As a result, the literature is virtually
silent on the interplay between a manager’s personal and professional investments.1
This paper begins to fill this gap, focusing on a model with two investment op-
portunities, one accessible to the fund, the other accessible to the manager’s private
account. Investment opportunities are constant over time, and potentially correlated.
To make the model tractable, and consistently with the literature, we consider a fund
manager with a constant relative risk aversion and a long horizon, who maximizes
expected utility from private wealth. The assumption of a long horizon means, in par-
ticular, that the model’s conclusions are driven by a stationary risk-return tradeoff,
and are indifferent to the one-time, short-term profits that materialize near the hori-
zon, such as by taking excessive risk in the fund, in order to increase the probability
of earning more fees before the horizon approaches.
For both hedge and mutual fund managers, we find the manager’s optimal invest-
ment policies explicitly. The optimal portfolio for the fund entails a constant risky
proportion, which corresponds to the manager’s own risk aversion for mutual funds,
while for hedge funds it corresponds to the effective risk aversion identified by Gua-
soni and Obło´j (2013) in the absence of private investments.
The optimal policy for private wealth is more complex. For both hedge and mutual
funds, the manager leaves earned fees in the safe asset, investing remaining wealth
according to an optimal constant-proportion portfolio, which corresponds to the man-
ager’s own risk aversion. The result of these policies combined is that the manager
obtains the maximum between fees’ and private investments’ welfare, but not more.
The significance of this result is threefold. First, the model predicts that the fund
composition does not affect the manager’s private investments, and that such invest-
ments also do not affect the fund composition – portfolio separation holds. In partic-
ular, even if investment opportunities are positively correlated, the manager does not
attempt to hedge fund exposure with a position in the private account. The intuition
is that, for a long horizon, the benefits from hedging are surpassed by the costs of
holding a short position in an asset with positive returns.
Second, the manager does not rebalance all private wealth. Indeed, the optimal
policy is to leave earned fees in the safe asset, and to rebalance only excess wealth.
1 As an exception, Aragon and Qian (2010) restrict earned fees to reinvestment in the fund, which also
excludes hedging attempts.
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This policy effectively replicates a pocket of private wealth that grows like the fund
(for mutual funds) or its high-water mark (for hedge funds), while leaving the other
pocket to grow at the optimal rate for private investments. Over time, the pocket
with the higher growth rate dominates the private portfolio, delivering the maximum
welfare of the two strategies. In contrast to usual portfolio allocation with multiple
assets, private investments can outperform the fund, but cannot augment its Sharpe
ratio through diversification, regardless of correlation.
Third, since the manager’s welfare is the maximum between the fund’s and the
private wealth’s welfares, our policy is always optimal, but never unique. Indeed, if
the fund delivers the optimal welfare, it does not matter how the manager invests pri-
vate wealth in excess of earned fees. By contrast, if private investments deliver the
optimal welfare, it does not matter how earned fees or even the fund are invested.
Although the lack of uniqueness is an extreme effect of the long-horizon approxima-
tion, it highlights that either the fund, or private investments, become the main focus
of a manager, without long-lasting interactions. Furthermore, the model yields the
conditions under which a manager focuses on the fund rather than on private wealth.
In summary, for a manager with a long horizon we find that neither performance
fees nor management fees create the incentive to use private investments to either
hedge or augment the fund’s returns. This conclusion remains valid if the manager
has private access to the fund’s investment opportunities, a situation that is nested in
our model when the correlation between investment opportunities is perfect, and the
Sharpe ratios are equal.
The results can inform the decisions of investors and regulators alike. For in-
vestors, the main message is that moral hazard can be mitigated by arrangements
that increase a manager’s horizon, such as longer lock-up periods, infrequent re-
demptions, deferred compensation, or clawback provisions. These observations are
broadly consistent with those of Aragon and Qian (2010), who find that some of
these features help alleviate asymmetric-information issues for hedge funds. From a
regulatory viewpoint, our results suggest that, in order to reduce managers’ incentive
to privately trade against investors’ interest, restrictions on managers’ private invest-
ments may be less important than incentive contracts that encourage managers to plan
with a long term perspective.
The analysis of this paper relies on the maximization of the equivalent safe rate
for constant relative risk aversion and a long horizon, which summarizes the expected
utility of the management contract in terms of an equivalent risk-free rate earned on
private wealth in lieu of the risky flow of fees and returns. This criterion focuses
on the stationary, persistent tradeoffs of the model, which dominate its long-term
performance, while neglecting initial conditions, such as the initial ratio between the
fund’s assets and the manager’s private wealth.
Importantly, this asymptotic criterion is immune to the well-known fallacies of
growth-optimal portfolios (Merton and Samuelson, 1974; Samuelson and Merton,
1974), in which the first two asymptotic moments of logarithmic wealth are used to
approximate expected utility, because the equivalent safe rate measures the exponen-
tial rate of growth of true expected utility with the horizon. Rather, the limit of this
criterion lies in the relative importance of such a rate in determining expected util-
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ity, equivalent to the question of whether the horizon is long enough – which is not
addressed in this paper.
The effectiveness of the equivalent safe rate is thus a quantitative (ultimately, em-
pirical) issue, similar to the relevance of turnpike portfolios (Leland, 1972) for long
horizons, which depends critically on the parameter values considered (Dybvig et al.,
1999). The equivalent safe rate performs well with horizons as short as two years in
portfolio choice with transaction costs (Gerhold et al., 2014), and with horizons of
about twenty years with stochastic investment opportunities (Guasoni and Robertson,
2012), while estimates for the problem considered here remain an open question.
Such a word of caution notwithstanding, the main message of the paper – that
long horizons mitigate moral hazards for fund managers – can be read in reverse
as pointing to short horizons as an essential ingredient of any model of portfolio
delegation that reproduces substantial moral hazards.
The literature on turnpike portfolios also suggests that our results are likely to re-
main valid in the same form for utility functions that are only approximately isoelastic
for high levels of wealth. Such a generalization is not pursued here, but its conclu-
sions would require the double qualification that the horizon be long enough so that
both initial conditions are irrelevant, and wealth grows fast enough into the domain
of approximate isoelasticity. On the other hand, relaxing the assumption made here
of constant investment opportunities is presumably more challenging. At best, the
parametric conditions for attention separation would be highly model-dependent. At
worst, the results may simply fail to hold, for example, in (admittedly improbable)
models where personal and professional investment opportunities alternately exclude
each other, therefore the manager can achieve a superior return by alternating atten-
tion to whichever opportunity is present.
The paper is most closely related to the literature in portfolio choice with hedge
funds (Detemple et al., 2010), high-water marks (Panageas and Westerfield, 2009;
Janecek and Sıˆrbu, 2012), and drawdown constraints (Grossman and Zhou, 1993;
Cvitanic and Karatzas, 1995; Elie and Touzi, 2008), and is the first one to consider
a manager who simultaneously trades in the fund and in private wealth to maxi-
mize personal welfare. The rest of the paper is organized as follows: the next section
presents the model, its solution, and discusses the main implications. Section 3 offers
a heuristic derivation of the main result using informal arguments of stochastic con-
trol, and Section 4 concludes. The formal verification of the main theorems are in the
Appendix.
2 Main Result
2.1 Model
A fund manager aims at maximizing expected utility from private wealth at a long
horizon. (For brevity, henceforth ‘private wealth’ is simply ‘wealth’, unless ambi-
guity arises.) To achieve this goal, the manager has two tools: allocating the fund’s
assets X between a safe asset and a risky asset SX , and allocating wealth F , including
fees earned from the fund, between the safe asset and another risky asset SF . The
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interpretation is that the manager’s wealth is invested in securities available to in-
dividual investors, while the fund may have access to investment opportunities that,
because of scale, regulation, or technology, are restricted to institutional investors.
Examples of such investments are institutional funds, restricted shares, such as Rule
144a securities, or high-frequency trading strategies.
Market
The fund’s (SX ) and private (SF ) risky assets follow two correlated geometric Brow-
nian Motions, with expected returns, volatilities and Sharpe ratios µX ,σX , νX = µ
X
σ X
and µF ,σF , νF = µ
F
σ F
respectively. Formally, consider a filtered probability space
(Ω ,F ,(Ft )t≥0,P) equipped with the Brownian Motions W X = (W Xt )t≥0 and W F =
(W Ft )t≥0, with correlation ρ (i.e., 〈W X ,W F〉t = ρt), and define the risky assets as
dSXt
SXt
=µX dt +σX dW Xt ,
dSFt
SFt
=µF dt +σFdW Ft .
To ease notation, we assume a zero safe rate.2 The manager chooses the proportion of
the fund piX =
(
piXt
)
t≥0 to invest in the asset S
X
, and the proportion of wealth piF =(
piFt
)
t≥0 to invest in the asset S
F
. The strategies piX and piF are square-integrable
processes, adapted to Ft , defined as the augmented natural filtration of W X and W F .
Hedge Funds
In a hedge fund, the manager receives a flow of performance fees subject to a high-
water mark provision. The high-water mark ¯Xt is the running maximum ¯Xt = max
0≤s≤t
Xs
of the net value of the fund.3 Then, with the investment strategy piX , the net fund
return equals the gross return on the amount invested XpiXt piXt , minus performance
fees, which are a fraction of the increase in the high-water mark. Thus, with 0 < α <
1,
dXpiXt = Xpi
X
t pi
X
t
(
µX dt +σXdW Xt
)− α
1−α d
¯Xpi
X
t . (2.1)
In this equation, the last term reflects the fact that each dollar of gross profit is split
into α dollars as fees, plus 1−α dollars as net profit, whence performance fees are
α/(1−α) times net profit.
Similarly, the return on the manager’s wealth equals the return on the risky wealth
Fpi
X ,piF
t pi
F
t , plus the fees earned from the fund, i.e.
dFpi
X ,piF
t = F
piX ,piF
t pi
F
t
(
µFdt +σFdW Ft
)
+
α
1−α d
¯Xpi
X
t . (2.2)
2 Guasoni and Obło´j (2013) consider a constant safe rate, and find that its value does not affect the
optimal fund’s policy, suggesting that the assumption of a zero safe rate is inconsequential.
3 In the rest of the paper, for any process (Xt)t≥0, ¯Xt denotes its running maximum.
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Note, in particular, that while the fund evolution depends only on its policy piX , the
evolution of wealth Fpi
X ,piF
t depends both on piF and on piX , as the latter drives earned
fees.
Mutual Funds
For a mutual fund manager, fees are proportional to assets under management, and
ϕ > 0 denotes the annual fees as a fraction of assets. Henceforth, with a slight abuse
of notation we use the letters X and F to denote the fund and wealth processes both
in the model for hedge funds and in the model for mutual funds. This notation has
the advantage of emphasizing the analogies between the two models, and should not
create confusion, since hedge and mutual fund managers exclude each other.
Thus, in the mutual fund model the joint dynamics of fund and wealth becomes
dXpiXt =Xpi
X
t pi
X
t
(
µX dt +σX dW Xt
)−ϕXpiXt dt, (2.3)
dFpi
X ,piF
t =F
piX ,piF
t pi
F
t
(
µF dt +σFdW Ft
)
+ϕXpiXt dt. (2.4)
whence the return on the fund dXpiXt /Xpi
X
t is decreased by the constant ϕ , while the
return on wealth dFpi
X ,piF
t /F
piX ,piF
t is increased by a variable amount, which depends
on the fund/wealth ratio XpiXt /F
piX ,piF
t .
Preferences
In both cases, the fund manager chooses optimal strategies pˆiX and pˆiF so as to max-
imize expected utility from wealth in the long run, that is, the equivalent safe rate
(ESR) of wealth (cf. Grossman and Zhou (1993); Dumas and Luciano (1991); Cvi-
tanic and Karatzas (1995)):
ESRγ(piX ,piF) =


lim
T→∞
1
T
lnE
[(
Fpi
X ,piF
T
)1−γ] 11−γ
, 0 < γ 6= 1,
lim
T→∞
1
T
E
[
lnFpi
X ,piF
T
]
, γ = 1.
(2.5)
This equivalent safe rate measures the manager’s welfare, and has the dimension
of an interest rate. It corresponds to the hypothetical safe rate which would make
the manager indifferent between (i) actively managing the fund and wealth, and (ii)
retiring from the fund, investing all wealth at this riskless rate.
2.2 Solution and Discussion
The main result identifies the manager’s optimal policies, and the corresponding wel-
fare. The result below is proved in the case of logarithmic risk aversion (γ = 1), or
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lower (γ ≤ 1), and hence allows to understand the risk-neutral limit γ ↓ 0. We con-
jecture that the same result remains valid for risk aversion greater than one, but we
cannot offer a formal proof for this case.
In the next two theorems, γ ∈ (0,1] denotes the manager’s relative risk aversion.
Theorem 2.1 (Hedge Funds) For a hedge fund manager compensated by high-water
mark performance fees with rate 0 < α < 1, the investment policies
pˆiXt =
µX
γ∗ (σX)2
, where γ∗ = α +(1−α)γ (2.6)
pˆiFt =
(
1− α
1−α
¯
ˆXt −X0
ˆFt
)
µF
γ (σF)2
, (2.7)
attain the manager’s maximum equivalent safe rate of wealth, which equals
ESRγ(pˆiX , pˆiF) = max
(
(1−α)
(
νX
)2
2γ∗ ,
(
νF
)2
2γ
)
, (2.8)
where ˆX and ˆF are the fund and wealth processes corresponding to pˆiX and pˆiF .
Theorem 2.2 (Mutual Funds) For a mutual fund manager compensated by propor-
tional fees with rate ϕ > 0, the investment policies
pˆiXt =
µX
γ (σX)2
, (2.9)
pˆiFt =
(
1− ϕ
∫ t
0 ˆXsds
ˆFt
)
µF
γ (σF)2
, (2.10)
attain the manager’s maximum equivalent safe rate of wealth, which equals
ESRγ(pˆiX , pˆiF) = max
((
νX
)2
2γ −ϕ ,
(
νF
)2
2γ
)
, (2.11)
where ˆX and ˆF are the fund and wealth processes corresponding to pˆiX and pˆiF .
Both fund investment policies (2.6) and (2.9) imply constant-proportion portfo-
lios, but with different exposures. For a hedge fund manager, the optimal policy cor-
responds to the risk aversion γ∗, which is between one and the manager’s own risk
aversion γ , and depends on the rate of performance fees α . This policy coincides with
the one obtained by Guasoni and Obło´j (2013) in the absence of private investment
opportunities, which is recovered in our model with νF = 0. In this case, the private
risky opportunity has zero return, and hence it is never used. By contrast, for a mutual
fund manager the optimal policy corresponds to the manager’s own risk aversion γ ,
and does not depend on the rate of proportional fees ϕ .
The private policies in (2.7) and (2.10) are extremely similar, and are best under-
stood by denoting cumulative fees up to time t by Ct , whereby Ct = α1−α
(
¯
ˆXt −X0
)
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for a hedge fund, while Ct = ϕ
∫ t
0 ˆXsds for a mutual fund. With this notation, in each
model the total risky and safe positions respectively reduce to
ˆFt pˆiFt =
(
ˆFt −Ct
) µF
γ (σF)2
,
ˆFt(1− pˆiFt ) =
(
ˆFt −Ct
)(
1− µ
F
γ (σF)2
)
+Ct .
These formulas show that for both hedge and mutual funds, the manager divides
wealth into earned fees Ct , which are set aside in the safe asset, and the rest, which
is invested in the constant-proportion portfolio with the manager’s own risk aversion
γ . With this investment strategy ˆFt = F0e
(2γ−1)(νF)
2
t
2γ2 +
µF
γσF W
F
t +Ct , and the managers’
welfare in (2.8) and (2.11) equal the maximum between the welfare of fees and the
welfare of private investments.
2.3 Portfolio Separation
A salient feature of these results is that the risky position in the fund policy is in-
dependent of private positions, and vice versa. In other words, the risky investment
in the fund ˆXt pˆiXt does not depend on µF ,σF , and the risky investment in wealth
ˆFt pˆiFt = F0e
(2γ−1)(νF)2t
2γ2 +
µF WFt
γσF µF
γ(σ F)2
does not depend on µX ,σX . Furthermore, nei-
ther pˆiX nor pˆiF depend on the correlation ρ between investment opportunities. We
call this property portfolio separation.4
Portfolio separation entails that a manager with a long horizon has no incentive
to hedge personal exposure to future fee income with private risky assets, regard-
less of their correlation. In fact, hedging does not take place even in the limit case
µX = µF ,σX = σF ,ρ = 1, which corresponds to a manager who has unfettered ac-
cess to the fund’s investments with private capital, and hence faces a dynamically
complete market. This result holds for both high-water mark performance fees, and
proportional management fees.
The biggest concern about high-water mark performance fees combined with pri-
vate investment opportunities is that when the fund and private investment opportu-
nities are highly correlated, managers may short private investments and take a larger
risk in the fund, which may be against clients’ interests. To understand why such
hedging is ineffective, suppose that risky assets are positively correlated, and con-
sider a manager with a fund trading well below its high-water mark. In this case, a
short position in the private asset is a poor hedge, because the high-water mark (and
4 Note that the proportion of risky private investment depends on total private wealth, hence on cumu-
lative fees Ct , which in turn depend on the fund proportion pˆiXt . Thus, portfolio separation also holds for
proportions, but only conditionally on the values of the fund and private accounts. By contrast, the dollar
value of the private risky investment ˆFt pˆiFt does not depend on cumulative fees (which are left in the safe
investment), and therefore portfolio separation holds even unconditionally for dollar positions.
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hence future income) is insensitive to small variations in the fund value, while the
short position reduces the long-term growth of wealth.
Consider now a mutual fund manager. If the two investment opportunities are the
same, the manager could hedge the flow of future fees with a strategy that swaps
their unique arbitrage-free price with a flow of payments that exactly offset the flow
of fees. Such a strategy is equivalent to selling future fees forward, and therefore it
entails a short position in the risky asset, leaving the manager with a zero net risky
exposure. However, such an exposure is not optimal, because it foregoes the growth
in wealth generated by that risky asset, and thus the manager wants to keep a positive
allocation to the risky asset, which reverses at least in part, and possibly more, the
hedging position.
The mathematical point is that the fee flow is a finite variation process both for
the hedge fund manager, since the high-water mark is increasing, and for the mutual
fund manager, since cumulative fees are absolutely continuous in time. Thus, though
the two investment opportunities may be correlated, the fee flow has zero covariation
with the private investment.
Put another way, portfolio separation implies that the manager has no incentive to
take more or less risk in the fund, in view of private investment opportunities outside
the fund. A priori, it may seem plausible that a manager takes more risk in the fund if
outside opportunities are attractive, because more risk is likely to lead to more fees in
the short term, which could then be invested in outside opportunities. However, this
tactic would only generate a one-time wealth transfer, not a lasting increase in the
growth rate of manager’s wealth, and hence is irrelevant in the long run.
In summary, the message of portfolio separation is largely positive: if horizons are
long, then moral hazards concerns are limited, because performance or proportional
fees essentially defeat any hedging incentives between fund and wealth. Yet, portfolio
separation has a downside – attention separation.
2.4 Attention Separation
As a consequence of portfolio separation, the manager’s welfare in (2.8) and (2.11) is
the maximum between the welfare from fees and the welfare from remaining wealth.
Thus, while the joint policies in (2.6), (2.7) and (2.9), (2.10) are optimal in all cases,
they are never unique. Indeed, if the manager’s welfare is due to the fund (that is,
fees), then the private investment opportunity becomes irrelevant, and pˆiF can be re-
placed, for example, with the policy piF = 0. Vice versa, if remaining wealth drives
the welfare, then the fund policy is irrelevant, and utter negligence (piX = 0) will
deliver the same result.
This rather extreme implication is driven by the assumption of a long-horizon,
which focuses on the risk-adjusted long-term growth rate, neglecting all short-term
effects. Still, it makes it clear that a manager’s commitment to the fund will easily
wane, unless its investments are superior to outside opportunities. The manager’s
attention inevitably shifts to either the fund, or wealth, whichever is more profitable.
For a hedge fund, equation (2.8) shows that the manager focuses on the fund
if and only if the fund’s Sharpe ratio νX exceeds the private Sharpe ratio νF by a
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multiple, which depends on the fund’s rate of performance fees and on the manager’s
risk aversion
νX
νF
>
(
1+ α
(1−α)γ
) 1
2
. (2.12)
For example, in the case of a logarithmic manager γ = 1, and of performance fees of
20%, the manager focuses on the fund, provided that its Sharpe ratio is 11.8% higher
than that of private investments. Such a condition is likely to hold in practice: Get-
mansky, Lo and Makarov (2004) find high Sharpe ratios in the hedge fund industry,
even after controlling for return smoothing and illiquidity.
The right-hand side in (2.12), which represents the manager’s attention thresh-
old, grows as risk aversion declines. The explanation is as follows: as risk aversion
declines to zero, the effective risk aversion γ∗ = α +(1−α)γ induced by the high-
water mark converges to α , which entails finite leverage in the fund. On the other
hand, the private portfolio is driven by the true risk aversion γ , which declines to
zero, leading to increasingly high leverage. Because leverage can arbitrarily mag-
nify expected returns, for sufficiently low risk aversion the private portfolio is always
more attractive.
Analagously, for a mutual fund, the manager focuses on the fund under the condi-
tion (ν
X )2
2 − (ν
F )2
2 > γϕ , which means that the squared Sharpe ratio of the fund must
exceed its private counterpart by twice the product between the risk aversion and the
rate of management fees. In other words, because proportional fees do not affect the
fund investment policy, but merely reduce its return, the condition is that the squared
Sharpe ratio of the fund must exceed the one of wealth enough to compensate for the
loss due to fees. A lower risk aversion means that the fund has a higher exposure to
the risky asset. Because the fund’s equivalent safe rate before fees (ν
X )2
2γ increases as
γ decreases, while the proportional fee ϕ remains fixed, ϕ becomes a smaller fraction
of total welfare (ν
X )2
2γ −ϕ , and therefore it is less important for an aggressive manager
than it is for a conservative one. As long as the fund is more attractive than private
investments νX > νF , a sufficiently aggressive manager will focus on the fund even
if the fee is high, because its relative impact is small.
Overall, attention separation brings both some bad news, as the manager may
grossly neglect the fund if it does not offer sufficiently attractive returns, and some
good news, since the conditions for attention to the fund seem mild, and, in the case
of hedge funds, a manager with low risk aversion is likely to leverage wealth rather
than the fund.
2.5 Growth and Fees
A puzzling feature of extant models of performance fees is that a manager prefers
lower performance fees, i.e. welfare is decreasing in α . The explanation of this find-
ing, common to the models of Panageas and Westerfield (2009) with risk-neutrality,
and of Guasoni and Obło´j (2013) with risk aversion, is that higher fees today reduce
the growth rate of the fund, leading to lower fees tomorrow. Both models assume that
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fees are invested at the safe rate in the manager’s account, and raise the question of
whether reinvestment can induce the preference for higher fees.
Equation (2.8) offers a qualified negative answer. If private risky investments are
available, there will be some threshold α∗, below which the manager prefers lower
fees, as in the absence of private investments, and above which the manager is in-
different to changes in fees, because the fund becomes irrelevant, as the welfare is
entirely driven by wealth. This threshold is in fact the value of α for which (2.12)
holds as equality.
This result is essentially a consequence of portfolio separation. Because the man-
ager is unable to compound the fund growth with wealth growth, either private invest-
ments make fees negligible, or are negligible themselves. Overall, the model shows
that the reinvestment value of fees is not sufficient to obtain the manager’s preference
for higher payout rates, which in turn is likely to involve intertemporal consumption
or fund flows.
3 Heuristic Solution
This section derives a candidate optimal solution for maximizing the ESR of a hedge
fund manager’s wealth, who is compensated by high-water mark performance fees,
with heuristic stochastic control arguments. For brevity, this argument is presented
only for the case of logarithmic utility, while the rigorous proof for all cases 0< γ ≤ 1
is in the Appendix.
To ease notation, in the rest of the paper we drop the superscripts piX and piF
from Xt and Ft , if no ambiguity arises. Denoting the state variable ¯Xt −X0 by Zt , the
manager’s value function of utility maximization from terminal wealth is
V (t,x, f ,z) = sup
piX ,piF
Et [lnFT |Xt = x,Ft = f ,Zt = z] .
For V as a stochastic process (because it is a function of Xt , Ft and Zt ), by Itˆo’s
formula,
dV = σX xpiXt
∂V
∂x dW
X
t +σ
F f piFt
∂V
∂ f dW
F
t +
(∂V
∂ z +
α
1−α
(∂V
∂ f −
∂V
∂x
))
d ¯Xt
+
(∂V
∂ t + xµ
XpiXt
∂V
∂x + f µ
FpiFt
∂V
∂ f
)
dt
+
((
σX xpiXt
)2
2
∂ 2V
∂x2 +
(
σF f piFt
)2
2
∂ 2V
∂ f 2 +ρσ
XσF x f piXt piFt
∂ 2V
∂x∂ f
)
dt.
Thus the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation for V (t,x, f ,z) is, for 0 < x <
z+X0, (where X0 is the initial fund’s value)
− ∂V∂ t = sup
piX ,piF
(
xµX piX ∂V∂ x + f µF piF ∂V∂ f +
(σX xpiX )
2
2
∂ 2V
∂ x2 +
(σF f piF )2
2
∂ 2V
∂ f 2 +ρσ
X σF x f piX piF ∂ 2V∂ x∂ f
)
,
with the boundary condition:
∂V
∂ z +
α
1−α (
∂V
∂ f −
∂V
∂x ) = 0 when x = z+X0.
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Note that here and in the rest of this section we use piX and piF (previously used
to denote investment strategies as stochastic processes) to denote feedback controls,
which are functions of state variables, when no ambiguity arises.
By the usual scaling property of logarithmic utility, and in the long-horizon limit,
we can rewrite the value function as V (t,x, f ,z) =−β t+ lnz+v(ξ ,φ), where ξ = ln xz
and φ = ln fz . Then in terms of v, the HJB equation becomes
β = sup
piX ,piF
(
µX piX ∂ v∂ ξ +µ
F piF ∂ v∂ φ +
(σX piX )2
2 (
∂ 2v
∂ ξ 2 − ∂ v∂ ξ )+
(σF piF )2
2 (
∂ 2v
∂ φ 2 − ∂ v∂ φ )+ρσX σF piX piF ∂
2v
∂ ξ ∂ φ
)
,
for 0 < x < z+X0, while the boundary condition reduces to
(1−α)− ∂v∂ξ (α exp(−ξ )+ (1−α))+
∂v
∂φ (α exp(−φ)− (1−α)) = 0,
when x = z+X0.
In the long run, the initial fund’s value X0 should not matter in this optimization
problem. Furthermore, since ¯Xt becomes large in the long run at optimum, ¯Xt ≈ Zt =
¯Xt −X0, and we can approximate the HJB equation and the boundary condition with
β = sup
piX ,piF
(
µX piX ∂ v∂ ξ +µ
F piF ∂ v∂ φ +
(σX piX )
2
2 (
∂ 2v
∂ ξ 2 − ∂ v∂ ξ )+
(σF piF )
2
2 (
∂ 2v
∂ φ 2 − ∂ v∂ φ )+ρσX σF piX piF ∂
2v
∂ ξ ∂ φ
)
,
(3.1)
when −∞ < ξ < 0, and
(1−α)− ∂v∂ξ +
∂v
∂φ (α exp(−φ)− (1−α)) = 0, (3.2)
when ξ = 0.
The first order conditions for piX and piF in (3.1) are, as functions of ξ and φ ,
pˆiX(ξ ,φ) =−
σF µX ∂v∂ξ
(
∂ 2v
∂φ 2 − ∂v∂φ
)
−ρσX µF ∂ 2v∂ξ ∂φ ∂v∂φ
(σX)2 σF
((
∂ 2v
∂ξ 2 − ∂v∂ξ
)(
∂ 2v
∂φ 2 − ∂v∂φ
)
−
(
ρ ∂ 2v∂ξ ∂φ
)2) , (3.3)
pˆiF(ξ ,φ) =−
σX µF ∂v∂φ
(
∂ 2v
∂ξ 2 − ∂v∂ξ
)
−ρσF µX ∂ 2v∂ξ ∂φ ∂v∂ξ
σX (σF)2
((
∂ 2v
∂ξ 2 − ∂v∂ξ
)(
∂ 2v
∂φ 2 − ∂v∂φ
)
−
(
ρ ∂ 2v∂ξ ∂φ
)2) . (3.4)
Plugging these two maximizers into (3.1) yields
β =
(
µX σ F ∂ v∂ ξ
)2( ∂ 2v
∂ φ2 −
∂ v
∂ φ
)
−2ρσ X σ F µF µX ∂ v∂ ξ ∂ v∂ φ ∂
2v
∂ ξ ∂ φ +
(
σ X µF ∂ v∂ φ
)2( ∂ 2v
∂ ξ 2 −
∂ v
∂ ξ
)
2(σ X σ F)
2
((
∂ 2v
∂ ξ 2 −
∂ v
∂ ξ
)(
∂ 2v
∂ φ2 −
∂ v
∂ φ
)
−
(
ρ ∂ 2v∂ ξ ∂ φ
)2) , (3.5)
when −∞ < ξ < 0.
(3.2) implies that ∂v∂ξ − ∂v∂φ (α exp(−φ)− (1−α)) is a constant for any φ ∈ R
when ξ = 0. We guess the solution to (3.5) as v(ξ ,φ)= δξ +b ln |α−(1−α)exp(φ)|,
where b and δ are parameters to be found. Plugging this guess into (3.2) gives
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b = 1− δ1−α . Finally, plugging v(ξ ,φ) = δξ +
(
1− δ1−α
)
ln |α − (1−α)exp(φ)|
into (3.5),(3.3) and (3.4) yields
β (δ ) = δ
2
(
νX
)2
+
(
1− δ
1−α
)
1
2
(
νF
)2
,
pˆiX(ξ ,φ) = µ
X
(σX )2
, (3.6)
pˆiF(ξ ,φ) =
(
1− αz
(1−α) f
) µF
(σF)2
. (3.7)
Note that pˆiX and pˆiF do not depend on δ , and taking δ to be 0 when 12
(
νF
)2 ≥
1−α
2
(
νX
)2
and 1−α when 12
(
νF
)2
< 1−α2
(
νX
)2 yields (2.8). (3.6) and (3.7) help us
conjecture the optimal policies for the fund and the private investments: the manager
puts the performance fees, which are αz(1−α) f of wealth in the safe asset, and invests
the rest in a Merton portfolio. For the fund, the same strategy as in Guasoni and Obło´j
(2013) is adopted, as to ensure the maximum ESR from performance fees.
4 Conclusion
A fund manager with a long horizon does not use private investment opportunities
to hedge personal exposure to fund performance. This result holds for a hedge fund
manager, paid by performance fees with a high-water mark provision, and for a mu-
tual fund manager, paid by management fees proportional to the fund’s assets. Indeed,
optimal policies for the fund and wealth are separate, in that each of them depends
only on the respective investment opportunity. The resulting welfare is the maximum
welfare between that of fees and of private investments, without any diversification
gain. Thus, the manager effectively focuses on either the fund or wealth, whichever
is more attractive.
An important open question, not discussed in this paper, is the quantitative effect
of finite horizons. In practice, a very short horizon is likely to lead to substantially
different conclusions, as typical investment opportunities offer relatively low returns,
but allow an unscrupulous manager to maximize the option-like, one-time payoffs
implied by fees by increasing the fund’s volatility near the horizon. The question
is to understand whether the short-term or the long-term considerations prevail for
medium investment horizons, such as five to ten years, depending on the ratio be-
tween the manager’s and the fund’s assets.
A Verification Theorems
This appendix contains the proofs of Theorem 2.1 and Theorem 2.2.
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A.1 Proof of Theorem 2.1
We start by defining the following processes, which represent cumulative log returns,
before fees, on the fund and wealth respectively,
RXt =
∫ t
0
[(
µX piXs −
1
2
(
σX piXs
)2)ds+σX piXs dW Xs
]
,
RFt =
∫ t
0
[(
µFpiFs −
1
2
(
σF piFs
)2)ds+σFpiFs dW Fs
]
,
RXt,T = R
X
T −RXt ,
RFt,T = R
F
T −RFt .
RX and RF depend on piX and piF , respectively, and should be denoted as RX ,piX and
RF,piF . We drop the superscripts piX and piF for ease of notation, unless it causes
ambiguity.
Equations (2.1), (2.2), Proposition 7 and Lemma 8 in Guasoni and Obło´j (2013)
imply that
Xt = X0eR
X
t −α ¯RXt ,
¯Xt = X0e(1−α)
¯RXt ,
Ft = F0eR
F
t +
α
1−α
∫ t
0
eR
F
s,t d ¯Xs. (A.1)
The discussion begins with two simple lemmas that are used often in the proof of
the theorems.
Lemma A.1 Let (Xt)t≥0 and (Yt)t≥0 be two continuous stochastic processes, and
define ¯Xt = max
0≤s≤t
Xs and Yt = min0≤s≤tYs. Then
¯Xt +Yt ≤
(
X +Y
)
t .
Proof Since (X +Y)t ≥Xs+Ys ≥Xs+Yt for every 0≤ s≤ t, it follows that (X +Y)t ≥
¯Xt +Yt .
Lemma A.2 Let (Gt)0≤t≤T be a continuous filtration, F ⊆ G0 be a σ -algebra, and
denote by EF and EGt the conditional expectation with respect to F and Gt , respec-
tively. If (At)t≥0 is a continuous and increasing process adapted to Gt for 0 ≤ t ≤ T,
and (Xt)t≥0 is a positive, continuous stochastic process such that EGt [Xt,T ] ≤C, for
every 0 ≤ t ≤ T, and some constant C, where Xt,T = XTXt , then EF
[∫ T
0 Xt,T dAt
]
≤
CEF [AT −A0].
Proof Since At is an increasing process, for a partition of [0,T ]: 0 = tn0 < tn1 < · · · <
tnn = T , tnk =
k
n
T for 1 ≤ k ≤ n,
∫ T
0
Xt,T dAt = lim
n→∞
n
∑
k=1
Xtnk ,T
(
Atnk −Atnk−1
)
.
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Thus,
EF
[∫ T
0
Xt,T dAt
]
= EF
[
lim
n→∞
n
∑
k=1
Xtnk ,T
(
Atnk −Atnk−1
)]
,
and by Fatou’s Lemma and the tower property of conditional expectation, the right-
hand side is less than or equal to
liminf
n→∞ EF
[
n
∑
k=1
Xtnk ,T
(
Atnk −Atnk−1
)]
= liminf
n→∞ EF
[
n
∑
k=1
EGtnk
[
Xtnk ,T
](
Atnk −Atnk−1
)]
.
(A.2)
Since EGt [Xt,T ]≤C for every 0 ≤ t ≤ T , (A.2) is less than or equal to
C liminf
n→∞ EF
[
n
∑
k=1
(
Atnk −Atnk−1
)]
=C liminf
n→∞ EF [AT −A0] =CEF [AT −A0] .
The proof of Theorem 2.1 is divided into the following two steps. First, any in-
vestment policies piX and piF satisfy the following:
ESRγ (piX ,piF)≤ max
(
(1−α)(νX)2
2γ∗ ,
(
νF
)2
2γ
)
,
which is proved in Lemma A.3. Second, this upper bound is achieved by the candidate
optimal policies in (2.6) and (2.7), as proved in Lemma A.8.
Lemma A.3 For a hedge fund manager compensated by high-water mark perfor-
mance fees with rate 0 < α < 1, the ESR induced by any investment strategies piX
and piF satisfies
ESRγ(piF ,piF)≤ λ1 = max
(
(1−α)(νX)2
2γ∗ ,
(
νF
)2
2γ
)
, for any 0 < γ ≤ 1.
Proof We prove this lemma for logarithmic utility and power utility, respectively.
The case of logarithmic utility. For convenience of notation, define
˜Xt =
{ 0 for t < 0,
1−α
α
F0 + ¯Xt −X0 for t ≥ 0.
Then ˜Xt is an increasing process, which has a jump at t = 0, and then grows with ¯Xt .
From (A.1), Ft = α1−α
∫ T
0 e
RFt,T d ˜Xt , and (2.5) can be rewritten as
limsup
T→∞
1
T
E
[
ln
(
α
1−α
∫ T
0
e
RFt,T d ˜Xt
)]
= limsup
T→∞
1
T
E
[
ln
∫ T
0
e
RFt,T d ˜Xt
]
= λ1 + limsup
T→∞
1
T
E
[
ln
∫ T
0
e
−λ1T+RFt,T d ˜Xt
]
. (A.3)
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Since d〈W X ,W F〉t = ρdt, W Xt = ρW Ft +
√
1−ρ2W⊥t , where W⊥ is a Brow-
nian Motion independent to W F . Denote EW⊥T as the expectation conditional on(
W⊥s
)
0≤s≤T (the whole trajectory of W⊥ until T ). By Lemma A.4 below,
limsup
T→∞
1
T
E
[
ln
∫ T
0
e
−λ1T+RFt,T d ˜Xt
]
≤ limsup
T→∞
1
T
E
[
ln
∫ T
0
e
RFt,T−
∫ T
t
(
1
2(ν
F)
2ds+νF dW Fs
)
e−
1−α
2 (ν
X)
2
t−(1−α)νX ρWFt d ˜Xt
]
= limsup
T→∞
1
T
E
[
EW⊥T
[
ln
∫ T
0
e
RFt,T−
∫ T
t
(
1
2(ν
F)
2ds+νF dW Fs
)
e−
1−α
2 (ν
X)
2
t−(1−α)νX ρWFt d ˜Xt
]]
(A.4)
≤ limsup
T→∞
1
T
E
[
lnEW⊥T
[∫ T
0
e
RFt,T−
∫ T
t
(
1
2(ν
F)
2ds+νF dW Fs
)
e−
1−α
2 (ν
X)
2
t−(1−α)νX ρWFt d ˜Xt
]]
,
(A.5)
where (A.4) follows from the tower property of conditional expectation, and (A.5)
from Jensen’s inequality.
Next, Lemma A.5 below implies that Mt = e
RF0,t−
∫ t
0
(
1
2(ν
F)
2ds+νF dW Fs
)
is a super-
martingale with respect to the filtration generated by
(
W Fs
)
0≤s≤t and
(
W⊥s
)
0≤s≤T (the
present of W F and W⊥, plus the future of W⊥). Thus,
EW⊥T ,W
F
t
[
e
RFt,T−
∫ T
t
(
1
2 (ν
F)
2ds+νF dWFs
)]
≤ 1, ∀ 0 ≤ t ≤ T. (A.6)
In addition, since At =
∫ t
0 e
− 1−α2 (νX)
2
t−(1−α)νX ¯W Ft d ˜Xt is an increasing process,
(A.6) and Lemma A.2 imply that
EW⊥T
[∫ T
0
e
RFt,T−
∫ T
t
(
1
2(ν
F)
2ds+νF dW Fs
)
e−
1−α
2 (ν
X)
2
t−(1−α)νX ρW Ft d ˜Xt
]
≤EW⊥T
[∫ T
0
e−
1−α
2 (ν
X)
2
t−(1−α)νX ρW Ft d ˜Xt
]
. (A.7)
Then, from (A.3) and (A.7), it follows that
limsup
T→∞
1
T
E [lnFT ]≤ λ1 + limsup
T→∞
1
T
E
[
lnEW⊥T
[∫ T
0
e−
1−α
2 (ν
X)
2
t−(1−α)νX ρWFt d ˜Xt
]]
.
Then, Lemma A.6 below proves that
limsup
T→∞
1
T
E
[
lnEW⊥T
[∫ T
0
e−
1−α
2 (ν
X)
2
t−(1−α)νX ρW Ft d ˜Xt
]]
≤ 0,
whence limsup
T→∞
1
T
E [lnFT ]≤ λ1.
The case of power utility. Define ˜Ft = Ft + ¯Xt . Then ˜Ft ≥ Ft and ˜Ft ≥ ¯Xt for every
t ≥ 0. Thus, the ESR of F is less than or equal to the ESR of ˜F . Lemma A.7 below
shows that this upper bound is also less than or equal to λ1.
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Lemma A.4 For λ1 defined in Lemma A.3,
limsup
T→∞
1
T
E
[
ln
∫ T
0
e−λ1T eR
F
t,T d ˜Xt
]
≤ limsup
T→∞
1
T
E
[
ln
∫ T
0
e
RFt,T−
∫ T
t
(
1
2 (ν
F)
2ds+νF dW Fs
)
e−
1−α
2 (ν
X)
2
t−(1−α)νX ρWFt d ˜Xt
]
.
Proof Define the stochastic process NTs = W FT −WFT−s, for 0 ≤ s ≤ T , and note that
NTs has the same distribution as W Fs . It follows that
lim
T→∞
1
T
E
[
−νF ¯NTT − (1−α)νXρW FT
]
= lim
T→∞
1
T
E
[−νF ¯NTT ]+ limT→∞ 1T E
[
−(1−α)νXρW FT
]
= lim
T→∞
1
T
E
[−νF ¯W FT ]+ limT→∞ 1T E[−(1−α)νX |ρ | ¯W FT ]= 0,
where the last equality uses the fact that, for a, b 6= 0 and Brownian Motion W ,
lim
T→∞
1
bT E [a
¯WT ] = lim
T→∞
1
bT
∫
∞
0
ax√
2piT
e−
x2
2T dx = 0. (A.8)
Thus,
limsup
T→∞
1
T
E
[
ln
∫ T
0
e
−λ1T+RFt,T d ˜Xt
]
= limsup
T→∞
1
T
E
[
ln
∫ T
0
e
−λ1T+RFt,T d ˜Xt
]
+ lim
T→∞
1
T
E
[
−νF ¯NTT − (1−α)νXρW FT
]
≤ limsup
T→∞
1
T
E
[
ln
∫ T
0
e
−λ1T−νF ¯NTT −(1−α)νX ρW FT +RFt,T d ˜Xt
]
. (A.9)
Now, note that ¯NTT ≥W FT −W Ft , λ1T ≥ 12
(
νF
)2
(T − t)+ 1−α2
(
νX
)2
t and (1−
α)νX ρW FT ≥ (1−α)νX ρWFt , for all 0 ≤ t ≤ T . Thus,
−λ1T −νF ¯NTT − (1−α)νXρW FT +RFt,T
≤− 1
2
(
νF
)2
(T − t)− 1−α
2
(
νX
)2
t−νF (W FT −W Ft )− (1−α)νXρW Ft +RFt,T
=RFt,T −
∫ T
t
(
1
2
(
νF
)2 ds+νFdW Fs
)
− 1−α
2
(
νX
)2
t− (1−α)νXρW Ft .
Plugging this inequality into (A.9) yields
limsup
T→∞
1
T
E
[
ln
∫ T
0
e−λ1T eR
F
t,T d ˜Xt
]
≤ limsup
T→∞
1
T
E
[
ln
∫ T
0
e
RFt,T−
∫ T
t
(
1
2 (ν
F)
2ds+νF dWFs
)
− 1−α2 (νX)
2
t−(1−α)νX ρW Ft d ˜Xt
]
.
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Lemma A.5 Let pi = (pit)t≥0 be adapted to {Ft}t≥0, the filtration generated by(
W Xs
)
0≤s≤t and
(
W Fs
)
0≤s≤t . Define {Gt}t≥0 as the filtration generated by
(
W Fs
)
s≤t
and
(
W Xs
)
s≤T . Then Mt = e
∫ t
0(pisdW Fs − 12 pi2s ds) is a super-martingale with respect to
{Gt}t≥0.
Proof Suppose pi is a simple process, i.e. pit = Σni=1p˜ii1[ti−1,ti) for a partition of [0,T],
0 = t0 < t1 < t2 · · ·< tn = T and p˜ii is Fti−1-measurable, for i = 1, · · · ,n. Then for any
0 ≤ s < t ≤ T ,
EW XT ,WFs
[
e
∫ t
0(piudWFu − 12 pi2u du)
]
= e
∫ s
0(piudWFu − 12 pi2u du)EW XT ,W Fs
[
e
∫ t
s (piudWFu − 12 pi2u du)
]
.
Since there exists 1 ≤ ks ≤ kt ≤ n such that tks−1 ≤ s ≤ tks and tkt−1 ≤ t ≤ tkt , s, t
and all the division points in between form a partition of [s, t], denoted by s = u0 <
u1 < u2 · · ·< um = t, with pit equal to a constant p¯i j (= p˜ii for some ks−1≤ i ≤ kt ) on
[u j−1,u j), for j = 1, . . . ,m. Then, since W F has independent increments,
EW XT ,W Fs
[
e
∫ t
s (piudW Fu − 12 pi2u du)
]
= EW XT ,WFs

e
m
∑
j=1
p¯i j
(
WFu j−W
F
u j−1
)
− 12 p¯i2j (u j−u j−1)


=
m
∏
j=1
EW XT ,W Fs
[
e
p¯i j
(
WFu j−W Fu j−1
)
− 12 p¯i2j (u j−u j−1)
]
≤ 1,
and thus, EW XT ,W Fs
[
e
∫ t
0(piudWFu − 12 pi2u du)
]
≤ e
∫ s
0(piudW Fu − 12 pi2u du)
.
For a general pi , from the definition of stochastic integral, there exists a sequence
of simple processes {pin}∞n=1, such that
∫ t
0
(
pins dW Fs −
1
2
(pins )
2 ds
)
n↑∞−→
∫ t
0
(
pisdW Fs −
1
2
(pis)
2 ds
)
a.s.
Hence, for 0 ≤ s ≤ t ≤ T ,
EW XT ,W Fs
[
e
∫ t
0(piudWFu − 12 pi2u du)
]
= EW XT ,W Fs
[
liminf
n→∞ e
∫ t
0(pinu dWFu − 12 (pinu )2du)
]
.
By Fatou’s Lemma, this is less than or equal to
liminf
n→∞ EW XT ,W Fs
[
e
∫ t
0(pinu dWFu − 12 (pinu )2du)
]
≤ liminf
n→∞ e
∫ s
0(pinu dWFu − 12 (pinu )2du) = e
∫ s
0(piudWFu − 12 pi2u du),
which confirms that Mt is a super-martingale with respect to {Gt}t≥0.
Lemma A.6 limsup
T→∞
1
T
E
[
lnEW⊥T
[∫ T
0
e−
1−α
2 (ν
X)
2
t−(1−α)νX ρW Ft d ˜Xt
]]
≤ 0.
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Proof By integration by parts,∫ T
0
e−
1−α
2 (ν
X)
2
t−(1−α)νX ρWFt d ˜Xt =
(1−α)F0
α
+
∫ T
0
e−
1−α
2 (ν
X)
2
t−(1−α)νX ρWFt d ¯Xt
=
(1−α)F0
α
+ e−
1−α
2 (ν
X)
2T−(1−α)νX ρW FT ¯XT −X0
+
1−α
2
(
νX
)2 ∫ T
0
e−
1−α
2 (ν
X)
2
t−(1−α)νX ρWFt ¯Xtdt
+(1−α)νX
∫ T
0
e−
1−α
2 (ν
X)
2
t−(1−α)νX ρW Ft ¯Xtd
(
ρWFt
)
. (A.10)
Since ¯Xt = X0e(1−α) ¯R
X
t , e−
1−α
2 (ν
X)
2
t−(1−α)νX ρW Ft ¯Xt ≤ X0e
(1−α)

RX· − (νX)
2
2 ·−νX ρW F·


t ,
following from Lemma A.1. Thus, from (A.10),∫ T
0
e−
1−α
2 (ν
X)
2
t−(1−α)νX ¯WFt d ˜Xt
≤(1−α)F0
α
+X0e
(1−α)
(
RX· − 12 (νX)
2·−νX ρWF·
)
T
+
1−α
2
(
νX
)2 X0 ∫ T
0
e
(1−α)
(
R·− 12 (νX)
2·−νX ρW F·
)
t dt
+(1−α)νX X0
∫ T
0
e
(1−α)
(
RX· − 12 (νX)
2·−νX ρWF·
)
t d
(
ρW Ft
)
. (A.11)
Since e
(1−α)
(
RX· − 12 (νX)
2·−νX ρWF·
)
t ≤ e(1−α)
(
RX· − 12(νX)
2·−νX ρWF·
)
T for every t ≤ T ,
(1−α)X0

(νX)2
2
∫ T
0
e
(1−α)
(
R·− 12 (νX )
2 ·−νX ρWF·
)
t dt +νX
∫ T
0
e
(1−α)
(
RX· − 12 (νX)
2 ·−νX ρWF·
)
t d
(
ρW Ft
)
≤(1−α)X0

(νX)2
2
e
(1−α)
(
RX· − 12 (νX)
2 ·−νX ρWF·
)
T T +νX e
(1−α)
(
RX· − 12 (νX)
2 ·−νX ρW F·
)
T ρW FT


=
(
1−α
2
(
νX
)2 T +(1−α)νX |ρ | ¯W FT
)
X0e
(1−α)
(
RX· − 12 (νX)
2 ·−νX ρW F·
)
T . (A.12)
Thus, from (A.11) and (A.12),
EW⊥T
[∫ T
0
e−
1−α
2 (ν
X )
2
t−(1−α)νX ρWFt d ˜Xt
]
≤EW⊥T

 (1−α)F0
α
+
(
1+
1−α
2
(
νX
)2 T +(1−α)νX |ρ | ¯W FT
)
X0e
(1−α)
(
RX· − 12 (νX )
2 ·−(1−α)νX ρW F·
)
T


=
(1−α)F0
α
+EW⊥T

(1+ 1−α
2
(
νX
)2 T +(1−α)νX |ρ | ¯W FT
)
X0e
(1−α)
(
RX· − 12 (νX )
2 ·−(1−α)νX ρW F·
)
T


≤ (1−α)F0
α
+EW⊥T
[
LδT
] 1
δ
EW⊥T
[
K
δ
δ−1
T
] δ−1
δ
, (A.13)
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for any δ > 1, by Ho¨lder’s inequality, where
KT =
(
1+ 1−α
2
(
νX
)2 T +(1−α)νX |ρ | ¯W FT
)
X0,
LT =e
(1−α)
(
RX· − 12 (νX)
2·−(1−α)ρνXW F·
)
T
Since δ > 1 and δδ−1 > 1,
EW⊥T
[
K
δ
δ−1
T
] δ−1
δ
≤
(
1+ 1−α
2
(
νX
)2 T +(1−α)νX |ρ |EW⊥T
[(
¯W FT
) δ
δ−1
] δ−1
δ
)
X0
=

1+ 1−α2 (νX)2 T +
√
2(1−α)νX |ρ |

Γ ( 1+ δδ−12 )√
pi


δ−1
δ √
T

X0, (A.14)
following from Minkowski inequality
(
E [( f + g)p] 1p ≤ E [ f p] 1p +E [ f p] 1p
)
.
Then (A.13) and (A.14) imply that for any δ > 1,
EW⊥T
[∫ T
0
e−
1−α
2 (ν
X)
2
t−(1−α)νX ρWFt d ˜Xt
]
≤ (1−α)F0
α
+CTEW⊥T
[
LδT
] 1
δ
,
where CT =

1+ 1−α2 (νX)2 T +√2(1−α)νX |ρ |
(
Γ (
1+ δδ−1
2 )√
pi
) δ−1δ √
T

X0.
Thus
limsup
T→∞
1
T
E
[
lnEW⊥T
[∫ T
0
e−
1−α
2 (ν
X)
2
t−(1−α)νX ρWFt d ˜Xt
]]
≤ limsup
T→∞
1
T
E
[
ln
(
(1−α)F0
α
+CTEW⊥T
[
LδT
] 1
δ
)]
≤ limsup
T→∞
1
T
lnCT + limsup
T→∞
1
T
E
[
ln
(
(1−α)F0
αCT
+EW⊥T
[
LδT
] 1
δ
)]
. (A.15)
Note that the limit in the first term is 0. Furthermore, since (1−α)F0αCT → 0 as T ↑∞ and
LT ≥ 1, for T large enough, (1−α)F0αCT < 1 ≤ EW⊥T
[
LδT
] 1
δ
. Thus, (A.15) is less than or
equal to
limsup
T→∞
1
T
E
[
ln
(
2EW⊥T
[
LδT
] 1
δ
)]
= limsup
T→∞
1
δT E
[
lnEW⊥T
[
LδT
]]
. (A.16)
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Since (A.8) implies that liminf
T→∞
1
δT E
[
−(1−α)
√
1−ρ2δνX ¯W⊥T
]
= 0, (A.16) equals
limsup
T→∞
1
δT E
[
lnEW⊥T
[
e
(1−α)δ
(
RX· − 12 (νX)
2·−ρνXW F·
)
T
]]
+ liminf
T→∞
1
δT E
[
−(1−α)
√
1−ρ2δνX ¯W⊥T
]
≤ limsup
T→∞
1
δT E
[
lnEW⊥T
[
e
(1−α)δ
(
RX· − 12 (νX)
2·−ρνXW F·
)
T
−(1−α)
√
1−ρ2δνX ¯W⊥T
]]
.
(A.17)
Then, by Lemma A.1, the running maximum and running minimum can be com-
bined, and (A.17) is less than or equal to
limsup
T→∞
1
δT E
[
lnEW⊥T
[
e
(1−α)δ
(
RX· − 12 (νX)
2·−ρνXW F· −
√
1−ρ2νXW⊥·
)
T
]]
= limsup
T→∞
1
δT E
[
lnEW⊥T
[
e
(1−α)δ
(
RX· − 12 (νX)
2·−νXWX·
)
T
]]
≤ limsup
T→∞
1
δT lnE
[
e
(1−α)δ
(
RX· − 12 (νX)
2·−νXW X·
)
T
]
, (A.18)
where (A.18) follows from Jensen’s inequality and the tower property of conditional
expectation.
Mt = eR
X
t − 12 (νX)
2
t−νXW Xt is a local martingale with respect to the filtration gener-
ated by
(
W Fs
)
0≤s≤t and
(
W⊥s
)
0≤s≤t . Then, since ¯Mt ≤ ¯M∞, which in turn is dominated
by a random variable X , and X−1 is uniformly distributed on [0,1] (cf. (54) in Gua-
soni and Obło´j (2013)), for 1 < δ < 11−α , (A.18) is less than or equal to
limsup
T→∞
1
δT lnE
[
( ¯M∞)(1−α)δ
]
≤ limsup
T→∞
1
δT ln
(∫ 1
0
x−(1−α)δ dx
)
= limsup
T→∞
1
δT ln
(
1
1− (1−α)δ
)
= 0,
which concludes the proof.
For the rest of this paper, let p = 1− γ .
Lemma A.7 limsup
T→∞
1
T
lnE
[
˜F pT
] 1
p ≤ λ1 for any 0 < p < 1.
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Proof Let p˜iFt = (
˜Ft− ¯Xt)
˜Ft
piFt . Investing piFt of ˜Ft − ¯Xt in the risky asset is equivalent to
investing p˜iFt of ˜Ft and thus p˜iFt can be regarded as an investment strategy for ˜Ft . Then
d ˜F pt = p ˜F
p−1
t
(
˜Ft − ¯Xt
)(
piFt µFdt +piFt σFdW F
)
+
p(p− 1)
2
˜F p−2t
(
˜Ft − ¯Xt
)2 (
piFt σ
F)2 dt + 1
1−α p
˜F p−1t d ¯Xt
= p ˜F pt
((
p˜iFt µF +
(p− 1)
2
(
p˜iFt σ
F)2)dt + p˜iFt σF dW F
)
+
1
1−α p
˜F p−1t d ¯Xt .
Solving this differential equation, ˜F pT = F
p
0 e
pRF,p˜i
F
T + 11−α
∫ T
0 pe
pRF,p˜i
F
t,T ˜F p−1t d ¯Xt .
Thus,
limsup
T→∞
1
T
lnE
[
˜F pT
] 1
p = limsup
T→∞
1
T
lnE
[
F p0 e
pRF,p˜i
F
T +
1
1−α
∫ T
0
pepR
F,p˜iF
t,T ˜F p−1t d ¯Xt
] 1
p
.
Since 0 < p < 1, from Dembo and Zeitouni (1998), Lemma 1.2.15, for any positive
processes ( ft )t≥0 and (gt)t≥0,
limsup
T→∞
1
T
ln( fT + gT )
1
p = max
(
limsup
T→∞
1
T
ln f
1
p
T , limsup
T→∞
1
T
lng
1
p
T
)
.
It follows that,
limsup
T→∞
1
T
lnE
[
F p0 e
pRF,pi
F
T +
1
1−α
∫ T
0
pepR
F,piF
t ,T ˜F p−1t d ¯Xt
] 1
p
=max

limsup
T→∞
1
T
lnE
[
F p0 e
pRF,pi
F
T
] 1
p
, limsup
T→∞
1
T
lnE
[
1
1−α
∫ T
0
pepR
F,piF
t ,T ˜F p−1t d ¯Xt
] 1
p

 . (A.19)
Note that, since 0 < p < 1, by Ho¨lder’s inequality,
E
[
F p0 e
pRF,p˜i
F
T
] 1
p
E

eq
(
−νFWFT −
(νF)
2
2 T
)

1
q
≤ E
[
F0eR
F,pˆiF
T −νFWFT −
(νF)
2
2 T
]
≤ F0,
where q = pp−1 , and it indicates that
E
[
F p0 e
pRF,p˜i
F
T
] 1
p
≤ F0E

eq
(
−νFWFT −
(νF)
2
2 T
)

− 1q
= F0e
(νF)
2
2(1−p) T . (A.20)
Thus,
limsup
T→∞
1
T
lnE
[
F p0 e
pRF,p˜i
F
T
] 1
p
≤ limsup
T→∞
1
T
lnF0e
(νF)
2
2(1−p) T =
(
νF
)2
2(1− p) . (A.21)
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For the second term in (A.19), since p < 1, and ˜Ft ≥ ¯Xt , ˜F p−1t ≤ ¯X p−1t , and
E
[∫ T
0
pepR
F,p˜iF
t,T e−pλ1T ˜F p−1t d ¯Xt
]
≤ E
[∫ T
0
e
pRF,p˜i
F
t,T −pλ1(T−t)e−pλ1t p ¯X p−1t d ¯Xt
]
=E
[∫ T
0
e
pRF,p˜i
F
t,T −pλ1(T−t)e−pλ1td ¯X pt
]
.
(A.20) implies that Et
[
e
pRF,p˜i
F
t,T −pλ1(T−t)
]
≤ 1. Then, since ∫ T0 e−pλ1td ¯X pt is an in-
creasing process, Lemma A.2 implies that
E
[∫ T
0
e
pRF,p˜i
F
t,T −pλ1(T−t)e−pλ1td ¯X pt
]
≤ E
[∫ T
0
e−pλ1td ¯X pt
]
,
and hence
limsup
T→∞
1
T
lnE
[
1
1−α
∫ T
0
pepR
F,p˜i
t,T ˜F p−1t d ¯Xt
] 1
p
= limsup
T→∞
1
T
lnE
[∫ T
0
pepR
F,p˜i
t,T ˜F p−1t d ¯Xt
] 1
p
=λ1 + limsup
T→∞
1
T
lnE
[∫ T
0
pepR
F,p˜i
t,T e−pλ1T ˜F p−1t d ¯Xt
] 1
p
≤λ1 + limsup
T→∞
1
T
lnE
[∫ T
0
e−pλ1td ¯X pt
] 1
p
. (A.22)
Now, integration by parts implies that
∫ T
0
e−pλ1td ¯X pt = e−pλ1T ¯X
p
T −X p0 + pλ1
∫ T
0
e−pλ1t ¯X pt dt
≤ e−pλ1T ¯X pT + pλ1
∫ T
0
e−pλ1t ¯X pt dt. (A.23)
Lemma A.1 implies that e−pλ1t ¯X pt ≤ X p0 e
(1−α)p
(
RX· − λ11−α ·
)
t for every 0≤ t ≤ T . Thus
(A.23) is less than or equal to
X p0 e
(1−α)p
(
RX· − λ11−α ·
)
T +X p0 pλ1
∫ T
0
e
(1−α)p
(
RX· − λ11−α ·
)
t dt
≤X p0 e
(1−α)p
(
RX· − λ11−α ·
)
T +X p0 pλ1Te
(1−α)p
(
RX· − λ11−α ·
)
T
=X p0 (1+ pλ1T )e
(1−α)p
(
RX· − λ11−α ·
)
T .
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Now, Lemma 9 in Guasoni and Obło´j (2013) with ϕ − r = λ11−α implies that
limsup
T→∞
1
T
lnE
[
X p0 (1+ pλ1T )e
p
(
RX· − λ11−α ·
)
T
] 1p
= limsup
T→∞
1
T
lnE
[
e
p
(
RX· − λ11−α ·
)
T
] 1p
≤ 0. (A.24)
Thus, (A.22) and (A.24) imply that
limsup
T→∞
1
T
lnE
[
1
1−α
∫ T
0
e
pRF,p˜it,T ˜F p−1t d ¯Xt
] 1
p
≤λ1 + limsup
T→∞
1
T
lnE
[∫ T
0
e−pλ1td ¯X pt
] 1
p
≤λ1 + limsup
T→∞
1
T
lnE
[
(1+ pλ1T )e
p
(
RX· − λ11−α ·
)
T
] 1p
≤ λ1. (A.25)
Then, (A.19), (A.21), and (A.25) imply that
limsup
T→∞
1
T
lnE
[
˜F pT
] 1
p ≤ max
( (
νF
)2
2(1− p),λ1
)
= λ1.
To prove Theorem 2.1, it now remains to show that the upper bound in Lemma A.3
is achieved by the ESR induced by the strategies in (2.6) and (2.7), and hence they
are optimal. Plugging them into the dynamics of Xt and Ft , the corresponding fund’s
value and wealth processes follow
d ˆXt = ˆXt
( (
νX
)2
1− (1−α)pdt +
νX
1− (1−α)pdW
X
t
)
− α
1−α d
¯
ˆXt ,
d ˆFt =
(
ˆFt − α1−α (
¯
ˆXt −X0)
)((
νF
)2
1− p dt +
νF
1− pdW
F
t
)
+
α
1−α d
¯
ˆXt .
Letting ˆRXT =
(1−2(1−α)p)(νX)2
2(1−(1−α)p)2 T +
νX
1−(1−α)pW
X
T , ˆRFT =
(1−2p)(νF)2
2(1−p)2 T +
νF
1−(1−pW
F
T ,
and solving the above differential equations imply that
¯
ˆXT = X0e(1−α)
¯
ˆRXT ,
ˆFT = F0e
ˆRFT +
α
1−α (
¯
ˆXT −X0).
Lemma A.8 For pˆiX and pˆiF in (2.6) and (2.7), ESRγ
(
pˆiX , pˆiF
)
= λ1, for any 0< γ ≤
1.
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Proof Let Gt = F0e ˆRFT and Ht = α1−α
(
¯
ˆXt −X0
)
, then ˆFT = GT +HT . From Lemma
A.3, it suffices to prove that ESRγ
(
pˆiX , pˆiF
)≥ λ1.
The case of logarithmic utility (p = 0). Since Ht is a positive process,
lim
T→∞
1
T
E
[
ln ˆFT
]
= lim
T→∞
1
T
E [ln(GT +HT )]≥ lim
T→∞
1
T
E [lnGT ] =
(
νF
)2
2
.
Likewise, since Gt is a positive process, Lemma A.9 below implies that
lim
T→∞
1
T
E
[
ln ˆFT
]≥ lim
T→∞
1
T
E [lnHT ] = lim
T→∞
1
T
E
[
ln
(
¯
ˆXT −X0
)]
= lim
T→∞
1
T
E
[
ln
(
e(1−α)
¯
ˆRXT − 1
)]
= lim
T→∞
1
T
E
[
(1−α) ¯ˆRXT
]
= lim
T→∞
1
T
E
[
(1−α)
(
(νX)2
2
·+νXW X·
)
T
]
.
Since
(
(νX)
2
2 ·+νXW X·
)
T
≥ (ν
X)
2T
2 + ν
X WXT =
(νX)
2T
2 − νX (−W X )T , which
follows from Lemma A.1,
lim
T→∞
1
T
E
[
(1−α)
(
(νX )2
2
·+νXW X·
)
T
]
≥ (1−α)
(
νX
)2
2
− lim
T→∞
1
T
E
[
(1−α)νX−W XT
]
=
(1−α)(νX)2
2
,
where the last equality follows from (A.8).
Thus, lim
T→∞
1
T
E
[
ln ˆFT
]≥ max
((
νF
)2
2
,
(1−α)(νX)2
2
)
= λ1.
The case of power utility (0 < p < 1). Since Ht is a positive process,
lim
T→∞
1
T
lnE
[
ˆF pT
] 1
p = lim
T→∞
1
T
lnE [(GT +HT )p]
1
p ≥ lim
T→∞
1
T
lnE
[
GpT
] 1
p =
(
νF
)2
2(1− p) .
Likewise, since Gt is a positive process, Lemma A.9 below implies that
lim
T→∞
1
T
lnE
[
ˆF pT
] 1
p ≥ lim
T→∞
1
T
lnE
[
H pT
] 1
p
= lim
T→∞
1
T
lnE
[(
¯
ˆXT −X0
)p] 1p
= lim
T→∞
1
T
lnE
[(
e(1−α)
¯
ˆRXT − 1
)p] 1p
= lim
T→∞
1
T
lnE
[
e(1−α)p
¯
ˆRXT
] 1
p
=
(1−α)(νX)2
2(1− (1−α)p).
where the last equality follows from Lemma 11 in Guasoni and Obło´j (2013). Thus,
lim
T→∞
1
T
lnE
[
ˆF pT
] 1
p ≥ max
( (
νF
)2
2(1− p) ,
(1−α)(νX)2
2(1− (1−α)p)
)
= λ1.
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Lemma A.9 For ˆRXT =
(1−2(1−α)p)(νX)2
2(1−(1−α)p)2 T +
νX
1−(1−α)pW
X
T ,
when p = 0,
lim
T→∞
1
T
E
[
ln
(
e(1−α)
¯
ˆRXT − 1
)]
= lim
T→∞
1
T
E
[
(1−α) ¯ˆRXT
]
,
and when 0 < p < 1,
lim
T→∞
1
T
lnE
[(
e(1−α)
¯
ˆRXT − 1
)p] 1p
= lim
T→∞
1
T
lnE
[
e(1−α)p
¯
ˆRXT
] 1
p
.
Proof Since e(1−α) ¯ˆRXT − 1 ≤ e(1−α) ¯ˆRXT , the “ ≤ ” part of the two equations is straight
forward. It suffices to prove the “ ≥ ” part.
When p = 1, since e(1−α) ¯ˆRXT = e(1−α) ¯ˆRXT − 1+ 1, the concavity of logarithmic
function implies that
(1−α) ¯ˆRXT = lne(1−α)
¯
ˆRXT ≤ ln
(
e(1−α)
¯
ˆRXT − 1
)
+
1
e(1−α)
¯
ˆRXT − 1
(A.26)
Since νX > 0, e(1−α) ˆRXT = e
(1−α)(νX)
2
2 T+(1−α)νXW XT ≥ 2e(1−α)νXW XT for sufficiently
large T , and
e(1−α)
¯
ˆRXT ≥ 2e(1−α)νX ¯WXT ≥ 1+ e(1−α)νX ¯W XT . (A.27)
Thus,
lim
T→∞
1
T
E
[
1
e(1−α)
¯
ˆRXT − 1
]
≤ lim
T→∞
1
T
E
[
e−(1−α)ν
X
¯W XT
]
= 0. (A.28)
Then, (A.26) and (A.28) imply taht
lim
T→∞
1
T
E
[
(1−α) ¯ˆRXT
]
≤ lim
T→∞
1
T
E
[
ln
(
e(1−α)
¯
ˆRXT − 1
)]
+ lim
T→∞
1
T
E
[
1
e(1−α)
¯
ˆRXT − 1
]
≤ lim
T→∞
1
T
E
[
ln
(
e(1−α)
¯
ˆRXT − 1
)]
.
When 0 < p < 1, from the concavity of the function f (x) = xp,
e(1−α)p
¯
ˆRXT ≤
(
e(1−α)
¯
ˆRXT − 1
)p
+ p
(
e(1−α)
¯
ˆRXT − 1
)p−1
.
Thus, from Lemma 1.2.15 in Dembo and Zeitouni (1998),
lim
T→∞
1
T
lnE
[
(1−α)p ¯ˆRXT
] 1
p
≤ lim
T→∞
1
T
lnE
[(
e(1−α)
¯
ˆRXT − 1
)p
+ p
(
e(1−α)
¯
ˆRXT − 1
)p−1] 1p
=max
(
lim
T→∞
1
T
lnE
[(
e(1−α)
¯
ˆRXT − 1
)p] 1p
, lim
T→∞
1
T
lnE
[
p
(
e(1−α)
¯
ˆRXT − 1
)p−1] 1p)
.
(A.29)
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Since p− 1 < 0, from (A.27),
lim
T→∞
1
T
lnE
[
p
(
e(1−α)
¯
ˆRXT − 1
)p−1] 1p
≤ lim
T→∞
1
T
lnE
[
pe(1−α)(p−1)ν
X
¯W XT
] 1
p ≤ 0.
(A.30)
Thus, (A.29) and (A.30) imply that
lim
T→∞
1
T
lnE
[
e(1−α)p
¯
ˆRXT
] 1
p ≤ max
(
lim
T→∞
1
T
lnE
[(
e(1−α)
¯
ˆRXT − 1
)p] 1p
,0
)
≤ lim
T→∞
1
T
lnE
[(
e(1−α)
¯
ˆRXT − 1
)p] 1p
,
because from (A.27),
lim
T→∞
1
T
lnE
[(
e(1−α)
¯
ˆRXT − 1
)p] 1p
≥ lim
T→∞
1
T
lnE
[
e(1−α)pν
X
¯WXT
] 1
p
=
(1−α)2 (νX)2 p
2
> 0.
A.2 Proof of Theorem 2.2
Solving the differential equations (2.3) and (2.4),
Xt =X0eR
X
t −ϕt ,
Ft =F0eR
F
t +
∫ t
0
ϕeRFs,t Xsds.
Theorem 2.2 is proved by arguments similar to those for Theorem 2.1: first prove
that for general strategies the ESR of wealth is bounded above by (2.11), and then
show that the ESR induced by the candidate strategies pˆiX and pˆiF in (2.9) and (2.10)
achieve this upper bound.
Lemma A.10 For a mutual fund manager compensated by proportional fees with
rate ϕ > 0, the ESR induced by any investment strategies piX and piF satisfies
ESRγ (piF ,piF)≤ λ2 = max
((
νX
)2
2γ −ϕ ,
(
νF
)2
2γ
)
, for any 0 < γ ≤ 1.
Proof We prove this lemma for logarithmic utility and power utility, respectively.
The case of logarithmic utility.
lim
T→∞
1
T
E [lnFT ] = λ2 + lim
T→∞
1
T
E
[
ln
(
F0eR
F
T−λ2T +ϕ
∫ T
0
e
RFt,T−λ2T Xtdt
)]
.
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Then (A.8) implies that, with NTt defined in the proof of Lemma A.4
lim
T→∞
1
T
E
[
ln
(
F0eR
F
T−λ2T +ϕ
∫ T
0
e
RFt ,T−λ2T Xtdt
)]
= lim
T→∞
1
T
E
[
ln
(
F0eR
F
T−λ2T +ϕ
∫ T
0
e
RFt ,T−λ2T Xtdt
)]
+ lim
T→∞
1
T
E
[
−νF ¯NTT −νX ρW FT
]
≤ lim
T→∞
1
T
E

ln

F0eRFT − (νF )
2
T
2 −νFWFT +ϕ
∫ T
0
e
RFt ,T−
(νF )2(T−t)
2 −νFWFt ,T e
−
(
(νX)
2
2 −ϕ
)
t−ρνX WFt
Xtdt



 ,
(A.31)
where the last inequality follows from the definition of λ2 and the fact that ¯NTT ≥Wt,T
for any 0 ≤ t ≤ T . Then with W⊥, the Brownian Motion independent to W F and that
W Xt = ρW Ft +
√
1−ρ2W⊥t , Jensen’s inequality implies that (A.31) is less than or
equal to
lim
T→∞
1
T
E

lnEW⊥T

F0eRFT − (νF)
2T
2 −νFWFT +ϕ
∫ T
0
e
RFt ,T−
(νF)
2
(T−t)
2 −νFW Ft ,T e
−
(
(νX)2
2 −ϕ
)
t−ρνX WFt
Xtdt



 .
(A.32)
From Lemma A.5, Mt = eR
F
t −
(νF)
2
t
2 −νFWFt is a super-martingale with respect to
the filtration generated by
(
W⊥s
)
0≤s≤T and
(
W Fs
)
0≤s≤t . Then, Lemma A.2 implies
that (A.32) is less than or equal to
lim
T→∞
1
T
E

lnEW⊥T

F0 +ϕ ∫ T
0
e
−
(
(νX)
2
2 −ϕ
)
t−ρνXWFt
Xtdt




= lim
T→∞
1
T
E

lnEW⊥T

F0 +ϕ ∫ T
0
e
−
(
(νX)
2
2 −ϕ
)
t−ρνXWFt
Xtdt




+ lim
T→∞
1
T
E
[
lne−
√
1−ρ2νX ¯W⊥T
]
, (A.33)
where the last equality follows from (A.8). Then, since ¯W⊥T ≥W⊥t for every 0≤ t ≤ T
and Xt = X0eR
X
t −ϕt , (A.33) is less than or equal to
lim
T→∞
1
T
E
[
lnEW⊥T
[
F0e−
√
1−ρ2νX ¯W⊥T +ϕX0
∫ T
0
eR
X
t −
(νX)
2
t
2 −ρνXW Ft −
√
1−ρ2νXW⊥t dt
]]
= lim
T→∞
1
T
E
[
lnEW⊥T
[
F0e−
√
1−ρ2νX ¯W⊥T +ϕX0
∫ T
0
eR
X
t −
(νX)
2
t
2 −νXW Xt dt
]]
≤ lim
T→∞
1
T
lnE
[
F0e−
√
1−ρ2νX ¯W⊥T +ϕX0
∫ T
0
eR
X
t −
(νX)
2
t
2 −νXWXt dt
]
,
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where the last inequality follows from Jensen’s inequality and the tower property of
conditional expectation. Then since Gt = eR
X
t −
(νX)
2
t
2 −νXW Xt is a super-martingale, by
Fubini’s Theorem, the above equals to
lim
T→∞
1
T
ln
(
E
[
F0e−
√
1−ρ2νX ¯W⊥T
]
+ϕX0
∫ T
0
E
[
eR
X
t −
(νX)
2
t
2 −νXW Xt
]
dt
)
≤ lim
T→∞
1
T
ln
(
F0 +ϕX0
∫ T
0
1dt
)
= lim
T→∞
1
T
ln(F0 +ϕX0T )≤ 0,
and this implies that lim
T→∞
1
T
E [lnFT ]≤ λ2.
The case of power utility. Define ˜Ft = Ft + ¯Xt , which implies that ˜Ft ≥ ¯Xt , ˜Ft ≥ Ft .
Thus the ESR of F is less than or equal to the ESR of ˜F , which will be proved in the
following to be also bounded above by λ2. Notice that this is similar to the technique
used to deal with the power utility case in the proof of Lemma A.3: adding a positive
and increasing process to wealth process without increasing the ESR. Here we choose
¯X , because the property ¯Xt ≥ Xt helps to derive (A.35) below, though the mutual fund
manager is not compensated by high-water mark performance fees.
Let p˜iFt =
˜Ft− ¯Xt
˜Ft
piFt , then for 0 < p < 1,
d ˜F pt =p ˜F
p−1
t
(
˜Ft − ¯Xt
)(
piFt µF dt +piFt σF dW Ft
)
+
p(p− 1)
2
˜F p−2t
(
˜Ft − ¯Xt
)2 (
piFt σ
F)2 dt +ϕ p ˜F p−1t Xtdt + p ˜F p−1d ¯Xt
=p ˜F p
((
p˜iFt µF +
p− 1
2
(
p˜iFt σ
F)2)dt + p˜iFt σF dW Ft
)
+ϕ p ˜F p−1t Xtdt + p ˜F p−1d ¯Xt .
Solving this differential equation, ˜F pt can be represented as a sum of three positive
processes,
˜F pT = F
p
0 e
pRF,p˜i
F
T +ϕ p
∫ T
0
e
pRF,p˜i
F
t,T ˜F p−1t Xtdt + p
∫ T
0
e
pRF,p˜i
F
t,T ˜F p−1d ¯Xt . (A.34)
Then, from Dembo and Zeitouni (1998), Lemma 1.2.15, if suffices to prove that
the ESR of each of the three terms in (A.34) is less than or equal to λ2.
From (A.21), lim
T→∞
1
T
lnE
[
F p0 e
pRF,p˜i
F
T
] 1
p
≤
(
νF
)2
2(1− p) ≤ λ2.
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For the second term in (A.34), since ˜Ft ≥ ¯Xt ≥ Xt and p− 1 < 0,
lim
T→∞
1
T
lnE
[
ϕ p
∫ T
0
e
pRF,p˜i
F
t,T ˜F p−1t Xtdt
] 1
p
≤ lim
T→∞
1
T
lnE
[∫ T
0
e
pRF,p˜i
F
t,T X pt dt
] 1
p
(A.35)
=λ2 + limT→∞
1
T
lnE
[∫ T
0
e
pRF,p˜i
F
t,T −pλ2(T−t)X pt e−pλ2tdt
] 1
p
=λ2 + lim
T→∞
1
pT
ln
∫ T
0
E
[
e
pRF,p˜i
F
t,T −pλ2(T−t)X pt e−pλ2t
]
dt,
where the last equality follows from Fubini’s Theorem. Then, since (A.20) implies
that Et
[
e
pRF,p˜i
F
t,T
]
≤ e
p(νF)
2
2(1−p) (T−t) ≤ epλ2(T−t), from the tower property of conditional
expectation,
lim
T→∞
1
pT
ln
∫ T
0
E
[
e
pRF,p˜i
F
t,T −pλ2(T−t)X pt e−pλ t
]
dt
= lim
T→∞
1
pT
ln
∫ T
0
E
[
Et
[
e
pRF,p˜i
F
t,T −pλ2(T−t)
]
X pt e−pλ2t
]
dt
≤ lim
T→∞
1
pT
ln
∫ T
0
E
[
X pt e−pλ2t
]
dt.
Since E
[
X pt
]
= E
[
X p0 e
pRXt −pϕt
]
≤ X p0 e
p
(
(νX)
2
2(1−p)−ϕ
)
t
, which follows from the ar-
gument similar to (A.20), and λ2 ≥ (ν
X)
2
2(1−p) − ϕ , limT→∞
1
pT
ln
∫ T
0
E
[
X pt e−pλ2t
]
dt ≤
lim
T→∞
1
pT
ln
(
X p0 T
)
= 0, which implies that lim
T→∞
1
T
lnE
[
ϕ p
∫ T
0
e
pRF,p˜i
F
t,T ˜F p−1t Xtdt
] 1
p
≤
λ2.
Finally, since ˜Ft ≥ ¯Xt and p− 1 < 0, following arguments similar to those in the
proof of Lemma A.7,
lim
T→∞
1
T
lnE
[
p
∫ T
0
e
pRF,p˜i
F
t,T ˜F p−1d ¯Xt
] 1
p
≤ lim
T→∞
1
pT
lnE
[
p
∫ T
0
e
pRF,p˜i
F
t,T ¯X p−1t d ¯Xt
]
= lim
T→∞
1
pT
lnE
[∫ T
0
e
pRF,p˜i
F
t,T d ¯X pt
]
≤ λ2 + lim
T→∞
1
pT
lnE
[∫ T
0
e−pλ2td ¯X pt
]
.
By integration by parts,
∫ T
0 e
−pλ2td ¯X pt ≤ (1+ pλ2T )X p0 e
p
(
RX· −ϕ·−λ2·
)
T . Then, ap-
plying Lemma 9 in Guasoni and Obło´j (2013) to the case of α = 0 and r = −λ2
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implies that
lim
T→∞
1
pT
lnE
[∫ T
0
e−pλ2td ¯X pt
]
≤ lim
T→∞
1
pT
lnE
[
e
p
(
RX· −ϕ·−λ2·
)
T
]
≤
(
νX
)2
2(1− p)−ϕ−λ2 ≤ 0,
which indicates that lim
T→∞
1
T
lnE
[
p
∫ T
0
e
pRF,p˜i
F
t,T ˜F p−1d ¯Xt
] 1
p
≤ λ2.
Now it remains to prove that the ESR induced by the candidate strategies in (2.9)
and (2.10) achieves (2.11).
Lemma A.11 For pˆiX and pˆiF in (2.9) and (2.10), ESRγ
(
pˆiX , pˆiF
)
= λ2, for any 0 <
γ ≤ 1.
Proof Plugging pˆiX and pˆiF into (2.3) and (2.4), with ˆRX = (1−2p)(ν
X)
2T
2(1−p)2 +
νX
1−pW
X
T
and ˆRF = (1−2p)(ν
F)
2T
2(1−p)2 +
νF
1−pW
F
T , the corresponding fund’s value and wealth satisfy:
ˆXT =X0e
ˆRXT−ϕT ,
ˆFT =F0e
ˆRFT +ϕ
∫ T
0
ˆXtdt.
Let Gt = F0e ˆR
F
T and Ht = ϕ
∫ T
0 ˆXtdt, then ˆFT = GT +HT . From Lemma A.10, it
suffices to prove that ESRγ
(
pˆiX , pˆiF
)≥ λ2.
The case of logarithmic utility. Since Ht is a positive process,
lim
T→∞
1
T
E
[
ln ˆFT
]
= lim
T→∞
1
T
E [ln(GT +HT )]≥ lim
T→∞
1
T
E [lnGT ] =
(
νF
)2
2
.
Likewise, since Gt is a positive process,
lim
T→∞
1
T
E
[
ln ˆFT
]≥ lim
T→∞
1
T
E [lnHT ] = lim
T→∞
1
T
E
[
ln
(
ϕ
∫ T
0
ˆXtdt
)]
= lim
T→∞
1
T
E

ln∫ T
0
e
(
(νX)
2
2 −ϕ
)
t+νXW Xt
dt


≥ lim
T→∞
1
T
E

ln∫ T
0
e
(
(νX)
2
2 −ϕ
)
t+νX WXt
dt

 . (A.36)
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Then since WXt ≥ WXT for every 0 ≤ t ≤ T , (A.36) is greater than or equal to
lim
T→∞
1
T
E

νX WXT + ln
∫ T
0
e
(
(νX)
2
2 −ϕ
)
t
dt

= lim
T→∞
1
T
ln
∫ T
0
e
(
(νX)
2
2 −ϕ
)
t
dt
= lim
T→∞
1
T
ln e
(
(νX)
2
2 −ϕ
)
T
− 1
(νX)
2
2 −ϕ
= max
((
νX
)2
2
−ϕ ,0
)
,
where the first equality follows from (A.8).
Thus, lim
T→∞
1
T
E
[
ln ˆFT
]≥ max
((
νF
)2
2
,max
((
νX
)2
2
−ϕ ,0
))
= λ2.
The case of power utility. Since Ht is a positive process,
lim
T→∞
1
T
lnE
[
ˆF pT
] 1
p ≥ lim
T→∞
1
T
lnE
[
GpT
] 1
p =
(
νF
)2
2(1− p).
Likewise, since Gt is a positive process,
lim
T→∞
1
T
lnE
[
ˆF pT
] 1
p ≥ lim
T→∞
1
T
lnE
[
H pT
] 1
p = lim
T→∞
1
T
lnE
[
ϕ p
(∫ T
0
ˆXtdt
)p] 1p
= lim
T→∞
1
pT
lnE



∫ T
0
e
(
(1−2p)(νX)2
2(1−p)2 −ϕ
)
t+ ν
X
1−pW
X
t
dt


p

= lim
T→∞
1
pT
lnE

T p

∫ T
0
1
T
e
(
(1−2p)(νX)
2
2(1−p)2 −ϕ
)
t+ ν
X
1−pW
X
t
dt


p
 .
Since 0 < p < 1, Jensen’s inequality implies that
E

T p

∫ T
0
1
T
e
(
(1−2p)(νX)
2
2(1−p)2 −ϕ
)
t+ ν
X
1−p W
X
t
dt


p

≥E

T p−1 ∫ T
0
e
(
p(1−2p)(νX)
2
2(1−p)2 −pϕ
)
t+ pν
X
1−p W
X
t
dt


=T p−1
∫ T
0
E

e
(
p(1−2p)(νX)
2
2(1−p)2 −pϕ
)
t+ pν
X
1−p W
X
t

dt = T p−1∫ T
0
e
(
p(νX)
2
2(1−p) −pϕ
)
t
dt,
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where the first equality follows from Fubini’s Theorem. Thus,
lim
T→∞
1
T
lnE
[
ˆF pT
] 1
p ≥ lim
T→∞
1
pT
lnE

T p

∫ T
0
1
T
e
(
(1−2p)(νX)
2
2(1−p)2 −ϕ
)
t+ ν
X
1−pW
X
t
dt


p

≥ lim
T→∞
1
pT
ln

T p−1∫ T
0
e
(
p(νX)
2
2(1−p) −pϕ
)
t
dt

= max
( (
νX
)2
2(1− p)−ϕ ,0
)
,
which implies that lim
T→∞
1
T
lnE
[
ˆF pT
] 1
p ≥max
( (
νF
)2
2(1− p) ,max
( (
νX
)2
2(1− p)−ϕ ,0
))
=
λ2.
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